 It is the most irreparable notch to be carved upon the new Turkey to try to explain the state’s positioning vis-à-vis society by referring only to the Kurdish issue among many other elements in the history of Turkish democracy. Turkey is neither Iraq nor Iran. | |
In those countries, the Kurds are, unlike in Turkey, approached as an ethnic group and there is always a certain margin of flexibility between the regime and the issue. However, the constituent element of Turkey has a regime mentality that does not use ethnicity for everyday politics and that, at the same time, does not turn a blind eye to it. While lacking flexibility, this mentality may produce an accordion-like approach in daily political matters. Consequently, it is safe to argue that Turkey’s Kurdish issue is a problem specific to the ideology that was forced upon our republic. Accordingly, it can be said the Kurdish feudal or clan-oriented social fabric that accommodates diverse Kurdish sub-identities in Turkey has been prevented from being able to unite its political opportunities since the beginning of the republic. In this context, the areas with dominantly Kurdish populations were problematically left outside of the National Pact (Misak-ı Milli) borders. Madrasas were the common denominators for a feudal or clan-oriented society. Indeed, with the establishment of the republic, madrasas started to serve as institutions where Kurdish identity, social fabric and political life were shaped and where the Kurdish language and Kurdish culture could flourish. The establishment of secular mentality The methodology of government adopted by the constituent elements of the republic imposed the closing down of madrasas and the establishment of a secular mentality. First, madrasas were closed down and then religion, which normally is the domain of society, was nationalized and, more importantly, Turkified. The political channels that were closed down during the era of a single-party regime that lasted for 27 years caused Kurds, Kurdish sub-identities, community identities and traditions to see the unifying power of religion as a haven. The resulting breakdown could not be ameliorated with the introduction of the multi-party regime as a consequence of democratic developments around the world. In accordance with the conditions prevalent in Turkey, Kurds’ capabilities to form a political party concerned with their own issues could not go beyond the confines of Ankara. When these limits were trespassed a 35-year-long trauma began. However, this is not the case in the countries neighboring Turkey. These countries did not attempt to take religion and ethnicity out of the hands of society and give them to the state. For instance, Iraqi Kurds have been using their own political parties that emerged out of their own society during the political struggle in northern Iraq for more than 50 years. Likewise, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI) and Komalah are Kurdish parties built upon the social fabric of Iran. The regime tradition of Turkey created by the National Pact also politically required establishing relations with figures from the Kurdish community from one election to another. Every political party tended to nominate for Parliament a certain agha, chief, tribal boss or certain members of Kurdish families that were regarded as rebellious, insofar as the regime would allow. Thus, Kurdish society in Turkey has been deprived of the opportunity to develop its own political dynamics. Accordingly, Kurdish society in Turkey has suffered from a continual dialectic of separation from or integration with its own political dynamics and development opportunities. On the other hand, experiencing these realities, Kurdish intellectuals have realized that they live in despair. Some Kurds who were not sufficiently integrated with the rest of the country and who maintained their traditional values within the ossified feudal/clan fabric of Kurdish society followed in the footsteps of aghas, chiefs and clan leaders. Realizing that they would not be able to express themselves through their Kurdish identity, this group had the courage to participate in politics by producing their own political identity. Those who had this courage adopted the leftist values that were also popular in the country from the early 1960s onward. Or in other words, leftist values have lent support to those who had such courage. However, they soon started to blend the socialist values they had developed with the above-mentioned ideology of Turkey. Thus, it can be argued that Kurdish politics has been in contact with various hues of the nationalist left that has been diversified at an international level. With the opportunities afforded to them by the leftist movement, Kurdish intellectuals and youth had their hopes for overcoming the obstructions that lay before them renewed. But, how could they get their search for freedom in line with their own society amid these ebbs and flows? Indeed, Turkey had entered a new era with the left, and the sole channel that could put the Kurdish reality on the political agenda was the left or, more correctly, socialist opening. Kurdish linguistic values Still, there was an egregious contradiction as Kurdish intellectuals, idealist youth and the new generations inspired by them would adopt a unique and expected approach in opposition to clan-oriented feudal forces, but unfortunately steered clear of the Kurdish language. This was because all Kurdish linguistic values were part of the underdevelopment of their social fabric. This implied the abandonment of linguistic and cultural values that were the product of thousands of years. Distancing themselves from their mother tongue and verbal culture would mean a great danger for Kurds. It was evidence of strength to be able to leave behind feudalism, but it was a weakness to not preserve their social fabric. Ideally, one should fight against the negative aspects of society and at the same time protect Kurdish identity. With about 2 million voters who voted for the now-defunct Democratic Society Party (DTP), Kurdish politics had thought it had a more robust way to become free of this vicious cycle. Indeed, there was a left that was not influenced by the ideology of the republic, but a “new Turkey.” Under these conditions, such energy should not be allowed to dissipate. Thanks to suitable conditions, for the first time Kurdish politics saw itself outside of the ideology of the republic. It also believed that it would not be able to create any other mass other than its own mass of followers. Thus, it was not possible to exclude the DTP and search for political unity. Indeed, politics is not something that can be planned at the table. Instead, it must be born and take shape in daily life. One mistake by a political player cannot automatically justify another player. Under the existing conditions, Kurdish politics had to carry a heavy burden to a safe harbor without the help of others. However, on Dec. 11, 2009, the Constitutional Court closed down the DTP on charges of being a focal point of activities that would undermine the integrity of the state, given their activities as well as their ties to a terrorist organization. This decision also blocked all the pathways available to Kurds. But this time the dominant ideology of the republic was not to be blamed. Perhaps, what should be blamed for this deadlock was the DTP’s failure to make an accurate assessment of the conditions and to opt for siding with the most intractable political movements, which had plans to strictly pursue their own interests, not those of the public, and which were planned at the table with self-styled actors. With the closure of the DTP, Kurdish politics had the willpower to continue with a new party under a different name and a partially changed shell. However, the new conditions were no longer those of previous years. In other words, Turkey’s new players have already taken their positions. However, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is still fumbling for its own position in the political scene of Turkey, far from its own society. This is continually leading the BDP to mistake its own position, causing its own constituency to lose time. The worst of it is that this is transforming the BDP into an intermediate actor that is (ab)used by political players. The BDP should urgently decide whether it can be a party of Turkey without betraying its own society. Indeed, the threat to the dignity of the Kurdish people is currently the biggest of all. The BDP’s biggest challenge is to maintain justifiable Kurdish political demands and to search for peace as well as keep its institutions and civil society free from manipulation. |
* Yusuf Ergen, Politcal Analyst based in Ankara
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